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Introduction: 
This chapter critically explores an emerging area of social work practice in the UK, namely its increasing 
role in counter-terrorism activities. The chapter explores the policy context within which social work 
in the UK, as well as many other professions, has now become legally mandated to identify and 
prevent violent extremism and terrorism, as well as report and/or work with, families or individuals 
where there are concerns about radicalisation and extremism.    We argue that whilst the social work 
professions incursion into counter terrorism work is presented in a benign and straightforward 
manner; i.e. as an extension of “normal” safeguarding activities, rather, this is evidence of an 
increasingly securitised profession.  We will subsequently explore the concept of securitisation that is 
traditionally used in International Relations, to evidence our concerns about increasingly securitised 
social work activities, by drawing on the work of Buzan, Waever and De Wilde (1998). 
We recognise that whilst the social work profession’s relationship with the state has always been 
problematic in term of the care versus control tension (Lavalette, 2011), the move into what is in 
effect, counter terrorism work, is something that social work practitioners should not accept 
uncritically, or even possibly at all. Our concern is that such policy and practice shifts, moves social 
work in the UK very decisively towards a securitised profession, away from one that is ethics and rights 
based. Whilst this chapter is written from a UK social policy perspective, given the globalisation and 
the issues of terrorism across the world,  it is likely that social workers worldwide may be tasked with 
managing the “problem” of radicalisation and extremism, in terms of identification and prevention, 
like the UK context, or perhaps working directly with those impacted by radicalisation and extremism, 
for example, returnees from conflict zones such as Syria, or indeed victims of terrorist attacks. The 
chapter begins with a brief account of the global context.   
 
The Global Context: 
Terrorism, despite the debates about a satisfactory definition (see for example Smelser, 2007 and 
Horgan, 2014), has long been a feature of many societies. Indeed, Koomen and Van Der Pligt (2016) 
argue that there have been reliably documented incidences of terrorism going back 2000 years.  It is 
clear therefore, that many people historically and currently, are impacted adversely by terrorism, 
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either directly or indirectly. Growing up in the 1970s and the 1980s in the UK for example, we recall 
all too well the conflict between the British state and the Irish republican movement and the resulting 
terrorist attacks that took place in Northern Ireland and the mainland (England).  The 9/11 attack in 
the US, nonetheless was deeply shocking, and unprecedented in the scale, as were the later atrocities 
committed in London on 7th July 2015 and the Manchester bombing in 2017 .  More recently, a number 
of countries in Europe, for example Italy, France and Germany have witnessed a rise in terrorist 
attacks. Indeed, in the early stages of writing this chapter, a terrorist attack took place in Barcelona, 
and a terrorist incident occurred in Finland.  The causes of terrorism are therefore historically and 
globally complex (Crenshaw, 2010). The impact of such terrorist attacks understandably causes 
uncertainty, panic and anxiety for governments, as well as significant worry for the populace.  We 
acknowledge at the outset therefore, that domestic UK policy is inextricably linked to wider global 
issues and concerns, and in our subsequent analysis that follows, certainly do not wish to minimise 
the very real and pressing concerns about terrorism in the UK, and further afield. Indeed, as UK 
citizens, we support counter terrorism activity to ensure that those who wish to do harm in the name 
of religious or political ideology, are identified and prosecuted. We feel the need to assert this, 
because in our experience, challenge of UK counter-terrorism policy and its impact on social work, has 
led to accusations of being apologists for terrorism, amongst other accusations which we explore later. 
Our aim here however, is to challenge such binary discourses, of being for or against counter terrorism 
prevention strategies, often referred to in the UK as “Preventing PREVENT” (Hussein, 2016). Such 
binaries discourses of course, are widely prevalent but  our aim however is to explore the “messy” 
middle ground, namely that if social workers in the UK and possibly further afield, are increasingly 
legislated to be involved in counter-terrorism activities,  how can it be done, safely, ethically and 
within the confines of social work values.   We now move on to consider the UK counter terrorism and 
policy context.  
 
The Policy Context: 
In July 2015, The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act became statute in the UK. This required a range 
of public institutions, i.e. schools, prisons and universities, to actively promote “British Values”, and 
required a wide range of frontline professionals to work within the PREVENT agenda. PREVENT was 
introduced in 2007 as one strand of the UK’s overall counter terrorism policy known as CONTEST.  
PREVENT’s aims on the surface appear uncontroversial, namely to identify those at risk of 
radicalisation and extremism, and second, to prevent people from being drawn into radicalisation, 
extremism or terrorism. Under the 2015 Counter Terrorism act, specified organisations must have 
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“due regard” to these requirements, in other words, work with and implement the PREVENT policy.  
The UK Government’s definitions of radicalisation and extremism are as follows.  Extremism is defined 
as the: 
“Vocal or active oppositions to fundamental British Values, including democracy, the 
rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faith and 
beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism, calls for the death of members 
of our armed forces, whether in this country or overseas”. 
 (HM Gov, 2014)  
 
And radicalisation is defined as the: 
“…process by which a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism 
leading to terrorism, committing terrorist acts either abroad or on home ground”   
                                                                                                             (HM Govt, 2014) 
 
What has also emerged in the field is the notion of non-violent extremism. The difference between 
violent extremism and non-violent extremism is described as: 
“Militant groups are usually the offshoot of [nonviolent] movements, and the 
difference ... lies not in their ideology and objective [but] in what they regard to be 
the appropriate strategy to achieve their aims”. 
                                                                                                       (Geelhoed, 2010:386) 
It is argued therefore that those promoting non-violent extremism, have a direct relationship to those 
who wish to utilise violent strategies to implement a proposed ideology or political change.  In terms 
of PREVENT, we can perhaps see the lack of a clear distinction between violent and non-violent 
extremism, as the policy aims more generally to prevent people from becoming radicalised and 
developing “extremist views” that may, or may not, lead to acts of terrorism.   Indeed, this has been 
one of the many criticisms of PREVENT, namely that it largely operates in what McCulloch and 
Pickering (2009) term a “pre-crime” sphere.  There are of course further issues about the need for a 
more precise definition of such terms, namely extremism and radicalisation. Sedgewick (2011) argues 
for example, that terms like extremism and radicalisation can of course, be debated. For example the 
term radicalisation can be used in different contexts, i.e. in three different contexts: the security 
context, the integration context, and the foreign-policy context. The point remains however that 
definitions of such terms remains somewhat problematic in terms of what it means operationally,   
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and how it intersects with other UK anti-terrorist legislation, namely the Terrorism Act, 2006, which 
updated the definition of terrorism originally found in The Terrorism Act (2000).   As it can be seen, 
PREVENT operates in the domain of pre-crime and as suggested earlier, has been subject to significant 
criticism and concern.  
 
Criticisms of PREVENT 
PREVENT has been described by a wide range of people, including academics, politicians and a former 
senior UK police officer, as “toxic” (see for example Halliday and Dodd, 2015;  Perraudin, 2016; Grice, 
2017).   Key political figures, for example, Baroness Warsi, the former Conservative Party Chairman 
has publicly branded PREVENT “toxic” (Grice, 2017) and  Sir David Ormand, who was the Government’s 
security and intelligence co-ordinator when Prevent began, was reported to have commented:          
“The key issue is, do most people in the community accept [Prevent] as protective of 
their rights? If the community sees it as a problem, then you have a problem.” 
                                                                                                                             (Grice, 2017) 
Long standing criticisms of PREVENT have centred on concerns that the policy; 
 is a way to “spy” on and infiltrate Muslim communities (Kundani, 2014) 
 promotes an unfounded level of suspicion centred on the Muslim population (Awan 2012) 
 is simplistic in its notion of the Muslim community (Spalek, 2013)  
 is based on individualistic positivistic assumptions about individuals which ignores wider 
structural inequalities (Coppock and McGovern, 2014). 
 serves to destabilise national security rather than enhance it (Pantazias and Pemberton, 
2009). 
 Is based on “thin narratives” consisting of stereotypical assertions that play to public fears 
and are centred on “othered” populations.  (McKendrick and Finch, 2016). 
 challenges the traditional egalitarian, emancipatory values of the social work profession 
resulting in social workers working on rather that with individuals (McKendrick and Finch, 
2017). 
 Serves to promote and justify moral panic, and ultimately undermines social work values 
(Stanley and Guru, 2015)  
As it can be seen criticisms of PREVENT are varied and wide ranging, focusing on the underpinning 
philosophy, the implementation and the practice implications of social work, being positioned in a 
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relatively new and under explored environment; namely social work activity in the field of counter 
terrorism. Sabir (2017) argues that such social work activity can be conceptualised as a form of counter 
insurgency whereby marginalised, frustrated and often young people are perceived by the state as 
potential national threats, that are subsequently responded to using a coercive approach which may 
serve instead to increase their disaffection, anger and frustration and having the undesired effect of 
making more extremist views more attractive. 
We feel that such thin conceptualisations inevitably lack a thorough exploration of the “why?” In other 
words; why do some individuals and or families, many of whom are constructed as “other” feel such 
disaffection and alienation? A more pertinent approach from the state may be to consider the role of 
social and foreign policy, as well as domestic policy, which may all serve to increase frustration and 
disaffection among marginalised and detached groups. We now move on to consider the arguments 
that support the policy.   
 
Proponents of PREVENT  
Proponents of PREVENT, i.e. those who argue that the policy is valuable, urgently needed, and 
essentially benign, not surprisingly come from those who have significant investment in the 
promulgation and implementation of the policy.  Criticisms of those who are perceived as “Preventing 
PREVENT” has been fierce, uncompromising and have been carried out in the public domain via the 
media.  For example, Sara Khan, now a government counter- terrorism Tsar (a term often used in the 
UK to denote a government official with expertise in a particular area) and former co-founder of 
Inspire, a counter-extremism and women’s rights organisation that was set up in 2008, argues that: 
..many Muslims organisations do not want to publicise the face that they support 
PREVENT….I have lost count of the number of articles, academic blogs and 
assumptions that are made about PREVENT…the at times lazy and uniformed debate 
around PREVENT is in part a result of a post-truth society…. [and] outlandish claims 
are published on the basis of flimsy evidence, and when a fact begins to resemble 
whatever you feel is true.”   (Khan, 2016)  
Additionally, Nazir Afzal, a former public prosecutor, who gained prominence in this role in the 




“….constantly undermined by myths that urgently need to be challenged….It’s 
stopped at least 150 people going to Syria, 50 of them children….its grass roots, it’s 
not about criminalising and it has an impact”   (Lusher, 2017). 
As we discussed at the outset of this chapter, the debate becomes polarised between those who are 
critical of PREVENT, and those who feel it is necessary and without ethical blemish or concern.   The 
space in which you can therefore constructively criticise PREVENT becomes contested. Indeed, our 
experiences to date, in terms of exploring the possible implications of PREVENT for social work policy 
and practice, has been subject to a series of strong emotional reactions.  This has seen us being 
accused of being apologists for terrorism, part of the preventing PREVENT lobby, and as such, engaging 
in peddling myths, half-truths, inaccuracies and overly generalised academic, i.e. highly theorised  but 
essentially anecdotal approach to the topic.  This has manifested in a  series of difficult to explain 
events, such as opportunities to disseminate our research via presentation being cancelled at short 
notice on the grounds of health and safety (thankfully not at our own institutions), an article we 
authored (McKendrick and Finch, 2015), disappearing from a journal’s online website for some 
months, without ever receiving an adequate explanation for its disappearance, and online documents 
(namely drafts of this chapter)  being sent via file sharing applications not being received. Additionally, 
our own concerns with PREVENT appears to have been perceived by some as risky, and certainly not 
based on the realities of practice. As social work academics however, interested more generally in the 
interface of governmental policy and social work practice, we should critically explore all policies that 
impact on social work policy and practice, and more importantly on the people we serve. PREVENT 
therefore, is one policy amongst many others but given, the relative “newness” of the duty to have 
regard to the PREVENT agenda, the lack of an evidence base, and given the strength of pre-existing 
concerns  raised by academics from other discipline areas, this to us, justifies the need to critically 
explore this policy further.  As we have consistently argued, we need to move beyond the binary 
debate of for, or against PREVENT, and seek to recognise the policies difficult contours, ethical 
challenges and moral ambiguities, towards a more nuanced, understanding of the complexities 
inherent in the application of this policy in practice, using research from other disciplines when 
needed.  Indeed, we need to hold in our minds two positions which are not contradictory, or an either 
or, namely the need for counter terrorism work, to protect all citizens, alongside concern that the 
current policy has implications for social work that are not comfortable and indeed could be 
potentially damaging to social work in the long term.   It is clear therefore, that whilst terrorism and 
counter-terrorism is studied in a  range of other disciplines, for example, psychology, criminology and 
terrorists studies to name but a few, it remains a contested  and controversial field.  What is clear 
however is that social work policy and practice in this area, in both the UK and elsewhere, is currently 
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under developed, under theorised and there is limited, if any empirical research about what is , or 
should be good practice in this area.  As we argued elsewhere, there is a concerning policy, practice 
and research vacuum which if not appropriately filled, could result in deleterious and oppressive social 
work practice (McKendrick and Finch, 2017). Unless there is a more dispersed and granular approach 
towards this policy, what may result is the coercive application of a restrictive and oppressive form of 
social work practice.  This of course, could be viewed as not anything different from the existing 
challenges of social work, namely, the balancing of the care vs control function, or as Neocleous 
(2007), a contemporary political theorist positions it, the “liberty-security” balance. We would 
contend however, that PREVENT marks a significant and decisive shift from care/liberty to 
control/security with an accompanying development of what we have termed elsewhere, a system of 
“securitised welfare” (McKendrick and Finch, 2017) and which we discuss here further. In other words, 
we are concerned how the normal practices of traditional welfare safeguarding have been co-opted 
and incorporated into the lexicon of counter terrorism work, and indeed, wish to articulate the danger 
that “safeguarding” becomes synonymous with counter terrorism work.  
 
The Appropriation of Safeguarding 
In the UK, the term safeguarding, which has largely replaced “child protection” as the term previously 
term utilised by social work and other professionals.  Safeguarding is also used in adult social work, 
social care and health settings, where there are concerns about adults.  The term safeguarding, 
nonetheless, has long standing and clear welfare connotations.   We became increasingly aware how 
the term “safeguarding” has been appropriated by various government politicians for firstly, use in 
counter terrorism work, and secondly,  being deliberately used to legitimise and justify excursion into 
counter terrorism and state security work.  Of course, an obvious limitation in setting out such a claim, 
is that pre-PREVENT, safeguarding and child protection, was some sort of golden age of neutral state 
intervention and care. Indeed, there has been a long history of concern that social workers are nothing 
more than agents of the state seeking to control the populace, and, at best, the role is to prevent 
people from succumbing to the worst impacts of capitalism (Davies, 1994).   More recently though, 
writers such as Featherstone et al (2016), Gupta and Blumhardt (2016) have expressed increasing 
concern about austerity and poverty, and its impact on individuals and society, not least increasing 
the chances of significant state intervention in family lives.  Recent research by Paul Bywaters et al 
(2017), for example, shows starkly the correlation between poverty, austerity and increased chances 
of children and young people being in state care.  These writers are therefore suggesting that social 
work has became far from emancipatory or empowering.  
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Returning however to the issue of the appropriation of the term safeguarding, which we have referred 
elsewhere as a conflationary linguistic device (McKendrick and Finch, 2015), was, and remains in our 
view, a deliberate tactic, to both substantiate and validate caring and emancipatory professions entry 
into counter terrorism work.  For example, we noted a UK government minister’s numerous 
proclamation about the links between counter terrorism work and repeated references to 
safeguarding.  The official in question, the former security and Northern Ireland minister James 
Brokenshire for example, stated: 
“One particular interest of mine is the importance of ensuring that our counter 
radicalisation strategy sits alongside other key areas of public sector work. I think it’s 
important that we articulate our counter radicalisation strategy within the context of 
safeguarding”.     
                                                                                                                                       (Gov.Uk, 2013) 
We noticed the term safeguarding used in relation counter radicalisation and extremism being 
increasingly noticeable in governments ministers’ speeches and policy pronouncements.  Indeed,   in 
May 2016, mention was made of a Counter-Extremism and Safeguarding Bill in the Queen’s Speech1 
(Dawson and Godec, 2017) although as the Guardian newspaper reported, the Bill was not pursued 
because of legal and definitional problems around the term “extremism, “non-violent extremism” and 
“British Values”, which ran the risk of bringing an unacceptable level of scrutiny to many law abiding 
citizens (Townsend, 2017).   
The point remains however that the legitimising impact of such work being “just safeguarding” rather 
than national security work is becoming ever more persistent. For example, we noted at a social care 
conference panel discussion on PREVENT that took place in London, 2015, the key message from a 
home office discussant, namely that “radicalisation was a part of the same safeguarding agenda as 
other preventative work done by social workers” (Stevenson, 2015).  As we explore later on, 
safeguarding in this arena, certainly feels very different from what we have previously termed, 
traditional forms of “welfare safeguarding” (McKendrick and Finch, 2017). The chapter now moves on 
to consider securitisation theory, which, as we will argue is a useful explanatory framework to critically 
appraise current UK social policy directives that impact decisively on social work in the UK, before 
returning to the issue of securitised safeguarding.  
 
                                                          
1 The state opening of Parliament in the UK, formally mark the new session of Parliament. The current 




Securitisation theory derives largely from the academic discipline of international relations. It’s most 
noted proponents are Buzan, Waever and De Wilde (1998) also known as the Copenhagen School.   In 
brief, securitisation theory, rather than focus on traditional international relations exploration of what 
constitutes a security threat, with a focus on military capability etc., focuses instead on the process of 
threat formation and maintenance. In other words, securitisation theory focuses on the process by 
which a state actor, using “speech acts” transforms a matter into an issue of security. Security 
therefore is a discursive process, whereby politicians, using speech acts, construct a threat, which 
usually leads to the enactment of emergency or special measures to deal with the “threat” (Wodak 
and Boukala.  As Balzacq (2005) argues, securitisation is thus a: 
“rule-governed practice, the success of which does not necessarily depend on the 
existence of a real threat, but on the discursive ability to effectively endow a 
development with such a specific complexion" 
                                                                                                                                        (Balzacq, 2005:179) 
Additionally, securitisation processes involve four components: 
 A securitizing actor/agent: an entity that makes the securitizing move/statement; 
 An existential threat: an object (or ideal) that has been identified as potentially harmful; 
 A referent object: an object (or ideal) that is being threatened and needs to be protected; 
 An audience: the target of the securitization act that needs to be persuaded and accept the 
issue as a security threat. 
.                                                                                                                                        (Buzer et al, 1998:36) 
We can see this starkly in terms of various Western countries responses to terrorist attacks. France 
for example, is still in a state of emergency since the Nice attacks in November 2015. In the UK, in the 
wake of the 7/7 terrorist attacks in London, we saw numerous declarations from the then Prime 
Minister, David Cameron, about Britain’s very values being under attack. For example, he argued that: 
“Isis poses an existential threat to the British way of life and Britain cannot hide from 
this threat”. 




We see this repeated in a range of government announcements, and indeed, in international contexts.  
Teresa May, at the time of writing, the UK’s Prime Minister, in the wake of the London Bridge terrorist 
attack in June 2017 proclaimed:  
“It is time to say enough is enough. Everybody needs to go about their lives as they 
normally would. Our society should continue to function in accordance with our 
values. But when it comes to taking on extremism and terrorism, things need to 
change.”  (Gov.Uk, 2017) 
A hard line therefore emerges therefore, where people’s rights are gradually curtailed and the normal 
rules of justice relaxed, in order to manage this existential threat, seen for example by the use of 
control orders. Again, we are not arguing that the terrorist threat is without validity, but rather, that 
the threat construction is exaggerated and particular “othered” communities are seen as increasingly 
problematic, and a threat to so called “mainstream” society.   
 
Securitisation, Social work and Safeguarding   
Whilst derived from international relation studies, we feel that securitisation theory has much to offer 
social work policy and practice, in terms of being a critical lens within which to explore not only the 
underpinning ideology of current policy directives and practices, either internationally, as in the case 
of traditional securitisation theory which explores international security relations, but also domestic 
UK policies and practices.  Additionally, it is potentially illuminating for social workers to see how 
threats are created and constructed and the resulting policy discourses that emerge.  Such a 
framework can also help us understand how it is the case that a rights based, emancipatory profession 
such as social work, and indeed other “caring” professions in the UK, has become legally mandated to 
counter terrorism?   Hence what we see in the UK in social work more generally has been a shift 
towards risk averse practices more generally. Indeed Fergusson (2008) argues for example, that social 
work policy has seen a decisive shift, away from generalised notions of welfare towards more risk 
averse, personalised and individualistic approaches which views the recipient of social work services, 
through a neo-liberal gaze. In other words, individuals are seen as disconnected from wider societal 
structures and risk therefore, becomes transferred to the state to the individual.  This is seen most 
readily Fergusson (2008) argues in personalisation policies but also in policies like PREVENT, that focus 
on individual acts without consideration of wider structural factors, disadvantage and inequalities 
(Coppock and McGovern, 2014).    
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As we discussed earlier, the appropriation of safeguarding into the lexicon of counter terrorism 
language and activities, is a normalisation process that in our view is deliberate and considered. By 
utilising strategies of rhetorical linguistic devices, the ethical dilemmas that are inevitably raised by 
counter terrorism work become down played. Indeed, an argument that such activities, are “just 
safeguarding” is not something to accept at face value.   We are making the argument therefore, that 
this new era raises the spectre of a new form of state social work, namely one of securitised 
safeguarding rather than a traditional, and whilst not exactly benign, welfare safeguarding.   
 
Implications for social work policy and practice. 
This discussion therefore leads to an important question about what is currently, and what should the 
social work professions role be in counter-terrorism, be it in the UK and further afield?.  The question 
was raised at the outset of the chapter as to whether social work as a profession, whilst legally 
mandated to carry out such work should indeed, be engaging in such activities?  It could be argued 
therefore, that social work can never be anything other than agents of the state, carrying out the 
state’s work, so by extension, focusing on preventing violent extremism and working with counter 
terrorism officers, should not be seen as anything new, merely as a natural and logical development.  
It was interesting to note that we were challenged once at a conference, to explain more why this 
policy was indeed something new and decisive (and indeed negative) in the history of social work in 
the UK.    Our response was (and is) that social work has silently slipped into anti-radicalisation work 
which poses distinct ethical dilemmas, not least how far peoples differing ideological views and beliefs 
may serve to put someone at risk, or indeed, in a family context, cause “significant harm” to children, 
the threshold at which the state is mandated to intervene in private life in the UK.  Such work therefore 
could entail, assessing the extent to which a child in a given family is at risk from significant harm 
because of their parents/carers political or ideological beliefs, identifying and stopping children and 
young people from going to Middle East zones, to partake in war or indeed, in a well-publicised case, 
marry Jihadi soldiers and working to stop young people being radicalised. Key questions remain 
however, not least the consideration as to whether this is indeed safeguarding work, like any other 
safeguarding work. 
A further issue to consider, is that having delved into some of the Terrorism and Critical Terrorism 
Studies literature, what is clear, is what we have termed elsewhere as “thin narratives” about the 
causes of radicalisation and extremism, are indeed just that, i.e. thin and the reality is a considerably 
more complex. Horgan (2009) for example, makes the important point that there is no one root cause 
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to explain involvement in terrorism, and that often thinking about terrorism is “rooted in age-old 
assumptions which are proven unfounded, impractical and devoid of empirical support” (2009:1). A 
similar point is made by Pisoiu and Hain, (2018) who argue that Terrorism and Critical Terrorism 
Studies are often based on a series of untested theories and assumptions.  What is also clear from 
some of the terrorist studies literature is that whilst there are lots of theories about why people 
become radicalised and the process of radicalisation, what is not clear is the profile of those at risk of 
being radicalised and which individuals go on to commit terrorist atrocities (Sageman, 2014; Koomen 
and Van Der Pligt, 2016).  Indeed this was the conclusion reached by a government report into the 7th 
July bombings in London, namely that there was not a consistent profile of the bombers to predict 
who was at risk of radicalisation in the future (Gov.Uk 2006).    Emerson, who was the United Nations  
Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
while countering terrorism, raised a similar concern, namely that  there existed dominant narratives 
about radicalisation which were based on a “fixed trajectory  of identifiable markers” (Emmerson, 
2016). Indeed, the governments training on PREVENT and associated documents, seem to us to 
provide thin explanations for highly complex phenomena and promotes a particular narrative about 
who is at risk from radicalisation that does not always accord with the terrorist studies research, or 
indeed reality.  
 
So returning to the question of how should social work engage and practice in this area, recognising 
the ethical dilemmas, debates and lack of empirical evidence we perceive a number of challenges. 
Initially we would identify a lack of critical exploration of the advance of counter radicalisation work 
as being best located in the public sector.  We advance concerns over the surveillance creep elements 
of this and the impact it is likely to have on the formation of relationships built on trust, respect and 
mutual understanding. We are aware of the potential for the social work profession being co-opted 
into forms of securitised safeguarding without there being sufficient discussion, awareness and 
debate around the implications of this. Finally, we are concerned that in a climate that is highly febrile 
and often on a high alert status response to issues around countering extremism become obscured in 
a fog or risk and concern over emotive topics such as terrorism and violence. 
 
Concluding Comments 
Social work is rightly proud of its traditions of social justice, emancipation and concerns over 
oppression and discrimination. This tradition has been long in the making and has faced significant 
challenges from governments, ideologies and policy. We see PREVENT and its lead into securitised 
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practice as a further example of this kind of challenge.  Our view is that there exists an urgent need 
for   debate, discussion and argument on this particular policy as, for us, its implications are far 
reaching and of significant concern. It is our hope that this chapter advances this cause and continues 





Awan, I. (2012) “‘I’m a Muslim not an Extremist:’ How the Prevent Strategy has constructed a ‘Suspect’ 
Community,” Politics & Policy, Vol.40 (6): pp:1158-1185  
 
Balzacq, T. (2005) The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context, European 
Journal of International Relations, Vol 11 (2) PP:171-201  
 
Bush, G. (2001) ‘Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People’, available online at 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/ 
documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf.   
Buzan, B, Waever, O, De Wilde, J, 1998, Security: A new framework for analysis, Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner 
Bywaters, P., Brady, G. Bunting, L., Daniel, B., Featherstone, B., Morris,. K., Scourfield, J., Sparks, T., 
Webb, C. (2017) Inequalities in English child protection practice under austerity: A universal 
challenge? Child and Family Social Work, DOI: 10.1111/cfs.12383 
, 
Cameron, D. (2015) Interview on Radio 4 Today Programme, available from 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/video/2015/jun/29/david-cameron-isis-threat-uk-audio 
accessed 11/11/17  
Coppock, V and McGovern,  M. (2014). “‘Dangerous Minds’? Deconstructing Counter Terrorism 
Discourse, Radicalisation and the ‘Psychological Vulnerability’ of Muslim Children and Young People 
in Britain.” Children & Society Vol, 28: pp242–256. 
14 
 
Crenshaw, M. (2010) Explaining Terrorism: Causes, Processes and Consequences, New York, Routledge  
Dawson, J. and Godec, S. (2017) Counter-Extremism Policy: An Overview, House of Commons Library, 
UK, available from  http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7238 
accessed 16/2/18 
 
Featherstone, B., Gupta, A., Morris, K. and Warner, J. (2016) Let’s Stop Feeding the Risk Monster: 
Towards A Social Model of Child Protection,   Families, Relationships and Society, 
doi.org/10.1332/204674316X14552878034622  
 
Ferguson, F. (2007); Increasing User Choice or Privatizing Risk? The Antinomies of Personalization. 
British Journal of Social  Work Volume 7 (3): pp: 387-403.  
 
Gov.Uk (2000) The Terrorism Act, Stationary Office, London, available from 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/1 (accessed 11/1/18) 
 
Gov.UK (2006) Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005, Stationary 
Office, London, available from  https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/report-of-the-official-
account-of-the-bombings-in-london-on-7th-july-2005  accessed 14/2/18 
 
Gov.UK (2013) Security Minister James Brokenshire: countering violent extremism through 
communications. Available at:  https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/security-minister-james-
brokenshire-countering-violent-extremism-through-communications Accessed: 18 February 2015). 
 
Gov.Uk (2017) PM Statement following London Terror Attack: 4th June 2017, available from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-statement-following-london-terror-attack-4-june-




Gupta, A., and Blumhardt, H. (2016) Giving Poverty a Voice: Families' experiences of social work 
practice in a risk-averse system’. Families, Relationships and Societies, Vol. 5, No. 1, 30.03.2016, p. 
163-172. 
Halliday J. & Dodd, V. (2015) UK anti-radicalisation Prevent strategy a ‘toxic brand’,      available from 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2015/mar/09/anti-radicalisation-prevent-strategy-a-toxic-
brand  accessed 7/12/17 
 
HM Government (2014) Prevent Duty Guidance: A Consultation, available online at www. 
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/388934/45584_ 
Prevent_duty_guidance-a_consultation_Web_Accessible.pdf. 
Horgan, J. (2009) Walking away from Terrorism, New York, Routledge 
Horgan, J. (2014) The Psychology of Terrorism (2nd Edition) New York, Routledge 
Hussain, D. (2016) The “Preventing PREVENT” Lobby is gaining momentum, Huffington Post, available 
from http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/dilly-hussain/prevent_b_7798448.html   accessed 12/1/18 
Gleave, R. and McNamara, L. (2015)  Non-violent extremism: some questions about laws and limits, 




Grice, A. (2017) Theresa May cuts a reassuring figure – but her anti-terrorism plans for the future leave 
a lot to be desired 
 http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/manchester-attack-salman-abedi-terrorism-prevent-
muslims-theresa-may-response-wrong-a7753496.html   accessed 7/12/17 
Geelhoed, F. (2010) “Fundamentalism,” in Ross, J.R (Ed) Religion and Violence: An Encyclopaedia of 
Faith and Conflict from Antiquity to the Present, New York, Routledge,  p. 368.  
 
Gov.Uk (2006) The Terrorism Act (2006) available from 




Khan, S. (2016) The anti-Prevent lobby are dominating the discourse, not all Muslims oppose Prevent. 
Available from  http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/religionpublicsphere/2016/10/the-anti-prevent-lobby-are-
dominating-the-discourse-not-all-muslims-oppose-prevent/   accessed 25/1/18 
Koomen, W. and van der Pligt, J. (2016) The Psychology of Radicalization and Terrorism, Abingdon, 
Routledge.  
Kundani, A. (2014) The Muslims Are Coming! Islamophobia, Extremism and the Domestic War on 
Teror, Verso 
 
Lavalette, M. (2011) Introduction in Lavalette M. (Ed) Radical Social Work Today - Social Work at the 
Crossroads,  Bristol, Policy Press 
 
Lusher, A. (2017) British Muslim 'industry' accused of undermining deradicalisation efforts, available 
from    http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/prevent-strategy-extremism-muslims-
islamist-terrorism-nazir-afzal-muslim-council-of-britain-islamic-a7771071.html accessed 25/1/18 
McCulloch, J. and Pickering, S. (2009) Pre-Crime and Counter-Terrorism – Imagining Future Crime in 
the ‘War on Terror’. British Journal of Criminology, Vol. 49, pp:628-645 
 
McKendrick, D. and Finch, J. (2017) Downpressor man: securitsation, safeguarding and social work, 
Critical and Radical Social Work,  doi.org/10.1332/204986017X15029697482460 
 
McKendrick, D. and Finch, J. (2016) “Under Heavy Manners: Social Work, Radicalisation, Troubled 
Families and Non-linear War, British Journal of Social Work.  47 (2): 308-324.  
Neocleous, M. (2007) Security, Liberty and the Myth of Balance: Towards a Critique of Security Politics, 
Contemporary Political Theory, Vol 6 (2) p131-149 
 
Pantazis, C. and Pemberton, S. (2009) From the ‘Old’ to the ‘New’ Suspect Community, British Journal 




Perraudin, F. (2016)  “Andy Burnham calls for 'toxic' Prevent strategy to be scrapped” 
  available from https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/09/andy-burnham-calls-for-toxic-
prevent-strategy-to-be-scrapped accessed 6/7/17 
Pisou. D. and Hain, S. (2018) Theories of Terrorism: An Introduction, Abingdon, Routledge 
Sabir, R. (2017) Blurred lines and false dichotomies: Integrating counterinsurgency into the UK’s 
domestic ‘war on terror’ Critical Social Policy 37, Issue 2, pp. 202 - 224  
Sageman, M. (2014) The stagnation in terrorism research. Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol 26, pp: 
565-580 
Sedgewick, M. (2010)  The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion. Terrorism and Political 
Violence, Volume 22 (4) pp470-494 
 
Smelser, N.J. (2007) The Faces of Terrorism: Sociological and Psychological Dimensions , Princeton, 
Princeton University Press  
Spalek, B. (2013) Counter-Terrorism Police and Community Engagement in Britain, Community 
Focused or Community Targeted? Countering Extremism p 55 – 71. Imperial College Press 
 
Stanley, T., & Guru, S. (2015). Childhood Radicalisation Risk: An Emerging Practice Issue. Practice: 
Social Work in Action I, 1-14. doi:10.1080/09503153.2015.1053858 
 
Stevenson, L. (2015)  “Radicalisation Cases no Different from Safeguarding Cases” Commnunity Care 
online,  available from http://www.communitycare.co.uk/2015/11/04/radicalisation-cases-different-
safeguarding-work/  (accessed 6/12/17)  
Townsend, M. (2017) Theresa May’s counter-terrorism bill close to ‘sinking without trace’, The 
Guardian online, available from https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jan/29/theresa-may-
counter-terrorism-bill-sinking-without-trace-extremism-british-values  accessed 16/2/18 
 
Wodak, R. and Boukala, S. (2014)  Talking about Solidarity and Security in an Age of Crisis: the Revival 
of Nationalism and Protectionism in the European Union -  A Discourse-Historical Approach, in Carta, 
C and Morin, J. (Eds) EU Foreign Policy through the Lens of Discourse Analysis: Making Sense of 
Diversity, Farnham, Ashgate.   
